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JURISDICTION
The Appellate Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to § 78-2a3(2)(j) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellant Robin Martella ("Martella") asserts four issues on appeal. The
first three issues relate to the trial court's conclusions of law based on the facts.
The fourth issue relates to a procedural error.
Issue 1: Did the trial court err when it concluded, as a matter of law, that
"the parties intended the 'feed on hand' to be an item included and being sold under
the Real Estate Purchase Contract (the "Contract")?"
Issue 2: Did the trial court err when it concluded, as a matter of law, that the
entire Contract was unenforceable?
Issue 3: Did the trial court err in failing to conclude, as a matter of law, that
Gunnison Dairy breached the Contract by refusing to submit to mandatory
mediation?
Issue 4: Did the trial court err in failing to rule on Martella's procedural
objection to the form of Gunnison Dairy's Summary Judgment Memoranda?
Standard of Review As To All Issues: On review of a motion for summary
judgment or a motion on the pleadings treated as a motion for summary judgment
under Rule 12(c), the party against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled
1

to have all the facts presented, and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom,
considered in a light most favorable to him. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d
104, 107 (Utah 1991); Morris v. Famsworth Motel 123 Utah 289, 293, 259 P.2d
297, 299 (1953). Inasmuch as a challenge to summary judgment presents for
review conclusions of law, appellate courts review those conclusions for
correctness, without according deference to the trial court (i.e., de novo).
Mountain State Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184,
192 (Utah 1991); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Utah Code Annotated § 70A-2-204(3), 1953 as amended:
Even though one or more terms are left open, a contract for sale does not fail
for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j), 1953 as amended:
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals over:
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.

2

STATEMENT OF CASE
This appeal is taken by Martella from the summary judgment entered in the
Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sanpete County, State of Utah, by the
Honorable David L. Mower.
Martella filed the Complaint commencing this action on November 10,
1998. (R. 1-24). The Complaint sought declaratory judgment and specific
performance of the Contract executed by the Gunnison Dairy Partnership
("Gunnison Dairy") and Martella, as well as damages for Gunnison Dairy's breach
of the Contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach
of express warranties. (R. 1-24).
On December 18, 1998, Gunnison Dairy filed its Motion for Summary
Judgment and accompanying Memorandum Supporting Motion for Summary
Judgment against Martella. (R. 106-224). Martella filed his Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Opposition to Gunnison Dairy's Motion for Summary
Judgment and moved for Summary Judgment himself on October 28, 1999 (R.
245-294). On November 29, 1999, Gunnison Dairy filed a Memorandum (1) in
Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Gunnison Dairy's Motion for Summary Judgment and (2) Opposing Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 317-343). Martella filed his Reply to
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Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on January 6, 2000
(R. 352-359).
A hearing on the motions was held on March 1, 2000, in the Sixth Judicial
District Court in and for Sanpete County, State of Utah, before the Honorable
David L. Mower (R. 362). Martella, represented by Terry L. Wade of Snow
Nuffer, and Gunnison Dairy, represented by Ken Chamberlain of Chamberlain
Associates, appeared for the hearing. After hearing arguments from both parties,
the Court took the cross-motions under advisement (R. 362). On March 8, 2000,
the Court entered its Order on the Motions for Summary Judgment containing its
Findings of Fact and Analysis (Conclusions of Law) (R. 363-66). The Order
granted Gunnison Dairy's motion and denied Martella's motion (R. 364).
Summary judgment was entered, accordingly, on March 30, 2000 (R. 367-71).
Martella timely filed his notice of appeal on April 4, 2000 (R. 374).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Martella relies on all facts pled in his Complaint (R. 1-24), his Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 245-294), his Reply Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 352-359), and facts raised at the Summary
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Judgment hearing (Summary Judgment Hearing Transcript). The facts most salient
to resolving the questions below are as follows:
1. On or about August 25, 1998, Martella entered into a Real Estate
Purchase Contract (the "Contract") with Gunnison Dairy under which Martella
agreed to purchase and Gunnison Dairy agreed to sell to Martella certain assets of
a dairy operation, including real property, certain livestock, equipment, trailer
homes and water rights ("Dairy Assets") (R. 264:3, 267, 280-82).
2. The Contract referred to Attachment No. 2 (which was in fact
Addendum No. 1 of the Gunnison Dairy Listing Agreement) for a complete list of
the personal property being sold. This list did not include feed (R. 248:2, 280-82).
3. Under the Contract, Martella agreed to purchase the Dairy Assets from
Gunnison Dairy for the total price of $2,800,000.00, to be paid as follows:
$15,000.00 Earnest Money payment; $485,000.00 to be carried by Gunnison Dairy
for up to six months; $2,300,000.00 to be paid in cash at closing (R. 264:6, 268).
4. Addendum No. 1 to the Contract expressly stated that "[p]rice does not
include feed on hand. Value to be negotiated at time of closing." (R. 264:7, 274).
5. The Contract did not require the parties to establish an agreement
regarding the purchase of feed as a condition to performance of the Contract (R.
264:9, 267-279).
6. Both parties agreed, at the time the Contract was executed, that the
5

parties were not mutually mistaken as to the material terms of the Contract,
including the term "feed on hand" (R. 122:D, 264:8).
7. Prior to the scheduled closing of October 9, 1998, the parties entered into
negotiations for the purchase and sale of the feed. Although initial negotiations did
not result in an agreement as to the quantity of the feed to be purchased, Martella
never gave any indication to the Gunnison Dairy that he did not intend to perform
under the terms of the Contract (R. 249:7, 265:10).
8. Without attempting any further negotiations, Gunnison Dairy gave
Martella notice on September 23, 1998, that it was unilaterally rescinding the
Contract (R. 249:8, 264:11, 285).
9. Upon receiving Gunnison Dairy's Notice of Rescission, Martella
requested that mediation be held immediately, pursuant to the mandatory
mediation provision of the Contract (Section 15). Gunnison Dairy, however,
refused to submit the matter to mediation (R. 249:9, 265:12, 287, 289).
10. On the day of closing and at all times thereafter, Martella has been
ready and willing to perform under the Contract concerning the sale and purchase
of the Dairy Assets (R. 249:10, 265:13, 291).

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erroneously reached its conclusion that the parties intended
the "feed on hand" to be an item included and being sold under the Contract
because it viewed the facts and drew inferences in a light that was unfavorable to
Martella, the non-moving party. Specifically, the trial court failed to draw any
inferences from the fact that nowhere in the Contract is "feed on hand" listed as an
asset being sold, nor is any of the purchase price allocated to the purchase of feed.
Likewise, the trial court improperly drew inferences regarding the practicality of
using feed other than that stored at the dairy complex and that Martella visited the
dairy complex and saw the "feed on hand" prior to the transaction.
The trial court also erred, as a matter of law, when it concluded that the
entire Contract was unenforceable. The purchase of "feed on hand" was a
secondary transaction separate from parties' agreement memorialized in the
Contract. Gunnison Dairy should not be allowed to "bootstrap" this secondary
transaction to the otherwise enforceable Contract. Even if the Parties intended
"feed on hand" to be an item included and being sold under the Contract, however,
the Contract does not fail for lack of definiteness as to the quantity and price of
"feed on hand" because local custom and usage can, and should be, used to
determine such. Gunnison Dairy should be estopped from using the definiteness
rule as sword to perpetrate this injustice.
7

Furthermore, the trial court erred by failing to conclude, as a matter of law,
that Gunnison Dairy had breached the Contract by refusing to submit to mandatory
mediation. According to the dispute resolution provision of the Contract, the
parties agreed that any dispute relating to the Contract "shall" be submitted to
mediation.
Finally, the trial court erred by failing to rule on Martella's procedural
objection to the form of Gunnison Dairy's Summary Judgment memoranda. Said
memoranda failed, among other things, to state clearly and concisely the
undisputed material facts relied upon by Gunnison Dairy.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, BY
CONCLUDING THAT THE PARTIES INTENDED THE "FEED ON
HAND" TO BE AN ITEM INCLUDED AND BEING SOLD UNDER
THE CONTRACT.
The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Gunnison Dairy was

inappropriate as a matter of law because it failed to view and draw inferences
from the facts in a light most favorable to Martella, the non-moving party. It is
well established that the non-moving party is entitled to have all the facts
presented, and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a light
most favorable to him. See Winger, 813 P.2d at 107; English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d
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1154, 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff d, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993); Morris, 123
Utah at 293, 259 P.2d at 299. From the record it is clear that the trial court failed
to make such inferences in concluding, as a matter of law, that "the parties
intended the 'feed on hand1 to be an item included and being sold under the
[contract]." (R. 365).
A.

If The Parties Had Intended "Feed On Hand" To Be Included In
The Contract, The Contract Would Have Listed Such As An Item
Being Sold.

The trial court, in the "Findings of Fact" portion of its Order on Motion for
Summary Judgment found that the Contract (as originally signed by Martella)
"contained some 12 pages including: a) The Real Estate Purchase Contract itself, 7
pages, b) Addendum #1 to REPC, 2 pages, and c) Addendum #1 to Listing
Agreement, 3 pages." (R. 364). It is important to note that the trial court found
Addendum #1 to the Listing Agreement ("Inventory List") to be part of the
Contract. This finding of fact is significant because it is through the Inventory List
and Paragraph 1.1 of the REPC that one can determine exactly what items of
personal property were being sold.1 Paragraph 1.1 of the REPC reads in part:
The following items shall also be included in this sale and shall be
conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: All
Livestock; all equipment, feed and manure handling, milking
1 For an excellent summary of the Inventory List and its integration into the
Contract to define the personal property being sold, see pages 26 through 37 of the
Summary Judgment Hearing Transcript dated March 1, 2000.
9

equipment, two trailer homes. All water rights presently being used.
See attachment #2 (Addendum #1 to listing agreement) for a complete
list.
(R. 12, 267). Paragraph 1.1 and the Inventory List speak nothing of feed. (See
generally R. 267, 280-82). In fact, the only place feed is used as a noun in the
entire Contract is Paragraph 5 of Addendum #1 to the REPC wherein it reads
"Price does not include feed on hand. Value to be negotiated at the time of
closing." (R. 364). Feed was not an asset being sold under the Contract. To
conclude, as a matter of law, that the parties intended "feed on hand" to be
included and sold as part of the contract is erroneous. The record, especially
Paragraph 1.1 of the REPC and the Inventory List (Addendum #1 to the Listing
Agreement), supports this position and exposes the trial court's failure to view the
facts in a light most favorable to Martella. If viewed in a light most favorable to
Martella, the trial court should have held that the parties intended the transaction to
be non-inclusive of feed because the parties did not list "feed on hand" as being an
asset in the Contract.
B.

The Trial Court Erred In Concluding That The Parties Intended
The "Feed On Hand" To Be An Item Included And Being Sold
Under the Contract By Basing Its Conclusion, In Part, On The
Inference That "The Only Practical Way" To Sustain The
Livestock To Be Purchased Was To "Draw From An Inventory
Of Feed Products Kept On Hand At The Dairy Site."

By making the conclusion in its Order that "the only practical way" to
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sustain the livestock Martella would be purchasing was to "draw from an inventory
of feed products kept on hand at the dairy site" (R. 365), the trial court failed to
consider the facts in a light most favorable to Martella. The trial court failed to
consider the fact that Martella could have obtained feed from other sources.
During oral argument on the parties' cross-motions, the trial court was informed
that Martella was an experienced cattleman who owned several cattle/feed-lot
operations in California.2 (Summary Judgment Hearing Transcript, p. 47). The
trial court was informed that Martella knew how to obtain feed and understood
feed pricing. Id Based on this information the trial court should have inferred
that Martella could have obtained feed sufficient to sustain the Dairy animals from
other sources, possibly even his own inventory in California.
Likewise, in its memoranda, affidavits and oral argument, the Gunnison
Dairy never asserted that it was essential to the well-being of the livestock to feed
them exclusively from the inventory stored on the Dairy complex. See generally
Defendants' Memorandum Supporting Summary Judgment and accompanying
affidavits (R. 108-224); Summary Judgment Hearing Transcript. Instead,

2 At the hearing on the parties' cross-motions, Martella's counsel stated "[t]he fact
is the man, Mr. Martella, is an experienced cattleman. He has a feed-lot
operation—or several of them in California. He's been in the dairy business. He
has access to feed. He knows pricing
he would have feed. He understands the
dairy business." (Summary Judgment Hearing Transcript, p. 47).
11

Gunnison Dairy has simply reiterated the fact that "fresh" and "high quality" feed,
sufficient to feed the Dairy's livestock, must be present at the Dairy complex or
within the Dairy's ability to purchase at all times.3 The Gunnison Dairy has never
provided any evidence in the record that feeding the livestock feed products
purchased elsewhere, assuming it was of good quality, would be detrimental to the
growth or development of the livestock present at the dairy complex.
Based on the evidence in the Record regarding the dairying process,
including the process of acquiring and dispensing feed to the dairy animals, it is
clear that the trial court's conclusion that the "only practical way" to sustain the
livestock is "to draw from an inventory of feed products kept on hand at the dairy
site" was erroneous and should not have been relied upon in making the legal
conclusion that the parties intended the "feed on hand" to be an item included and
being sold under the Contact. Although purchasing and utilizing feed already
stored at the Dairy complex could be viewed as "practical," such action is neither
"essential" nor "the only practical way" to sustain the livestock. Martella could
just as easily have purchased feed from other local farmers or transported feed
from California.

3 See Affidavit of Eugene A. Jensen (R. 168-71:15-17), Affidavit of Douglas F.
Bjerregaard (184-86:10-13), Affidavit of Gene Yardley (R. 202:14), and Affidavit
12

C.

The Trial Court Erred When It Concluded That The Parties
Intended The "Feed On Hand" To Be An Item Included And
Being Sold Under The Contract Based On The Fact That Martella
Had Visited The Dairy And "Saw The Inventory Of Feed On
Hand."

In citing the fact that Martella had visited the dairy complex and viewed the
inventory of feed on hand as a basis for concluding that the parties intended the
"feed on hand" to be an item included and being sold under the Contract, the trial
court drew an improper inference. Essentially, the trial court inferred that because
Martella saw Gunnison Dairy's feed on hand, while visiting the dairy complex, he
knew that feed was part of the transaction. Such an inference was improper
because it viewed the facts in a light most favorable to Gunnison Dairy, not
Martella. If viewed in a light most favorable to Martella, the fact that he saw some
feed on hand at the dairy complex prior to closing should mean nothing as to
whether the parties intended feed to be included in the transaction. Martella could
just as well have assumed that the feed present at the dairy complex during his visit
would be consumed or otherwise sold off prior to the closing.
In his affidavit, Martella stated that "[i]t was my understanding that the
Contract neither obligated me to buy Gunnison Dairy's feed nor required the
parties to establish an agreement regarding the purchase of the Gunnison Dairy's
feed as a condition to performing the contract" (R. 248:5, 264:9). This statement
of Robert Corbett, DVM (R. 222:4).
13

makes it clear that Martella did not think that he was purchasing Gunnison Dairy's
"feed on hand." Although Martella contemplated and even attempted to negotiate
the purchase of some of Gunnison Dairy's feed, this was mainly done "as a
courtesy to them." (R. 249:7, 265:10). These facts can hardly be interpreted to
mean that the parties intended the "feed on hand" to be an item included and being
sold under the Contract. Accordingly, the trial court erred, as a matter of law, by
concluding that the parties intended the "feed on hand" to be an item included and
being sold under the Contract.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE CONTRACT WAS UNENFORCEABLE.
The trial court's conclusion that the entire Contract was unenforceable, as a

matter of law, was incorrect and erroneous. The parties thoroughly negotiated the
terms and purchase price of the Dairy Assets, and the terms were clearly and
adequately stated. The matter of the feed was expressly excluded from the list of
assets and from the purchase price because it had not been resolved in their
negotiations. It was understood, just as it was memorialized in the documents, that
the matter of feed would be secondary to the transaction and that further attempts
would be made, later, to arrive at a deal as to the feed. Simply stated, the parties
did not intend "feed on hand" to be an item included and being sold under the
Contract.
14

Even if this Court affirms the trial court's conclusion that that the parties
intended "feed on hand" to be an item included and being sold under the Contract,
however, the fact that the price to be paid for the feed was left open did not make
the entire contract unenforceable. This Court recently held that, "[a]n agreement to
agree, by reason of its character, is not per se unenforceable." See Brown's Shoe
Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 P.2d 357, 363 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing Harmon v.
Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1979)).

This Court ruled in Brown's that

provisions otherwise capable of enforcement should not be ignored. See Id,
Utah courts have consistently enforced provisions within an agreement that
are otherwise capable of enforcement. In Kier v. Condrack, the Utah Supreme
Court did not permit a party to prevail on its claim that a Real Estate Purchase
Contract ("REPC") was an unenforceable "agreement to agree" simply because it
allowed the parties to determine the "terms of payment" under an option provision
at a later date. See 478 P.2d 327, 330 (Utah 1970). The Kier Court stated that:
"[i]t would seem inequitable and unjust to permit a seller to simply refuse
unreasonably to perform and seek specious excuses in an attempt to justify his
refusal." Id Using its equitable powers, the Kier Court upheld the trial court's
decision to specifically enforce the REPC. The Kier Court expressly endorsed the
trial court's position "that when the parties had reached agreement and committed
themselves on the major aspects of a transaction, that is, that the Defendant would
15

sell and the Plaintiff would buy at an agreed price . . . they should be obliged to act
in good faith in keeping their promises." See Id.
Applying the principles of Kier to the present case, Gunnison Dairy should
not be allowed to point to a prospective agreement regarding the purchase of feed
as an excuse for their non-performance of the Contract. The Contract, as it exists,
is fully capable of enforcement. As such, Gunnison Dairy has an obligation to act
in good faith and to uphold its promise to sell the Dairy Assets.
According to established precedent, Utah courts have held that a contract is
enforceable where the parties have reached a mutual agreement upon the terms and
obligations of the parties and where such terms have been set forth with sufficient
defmiteness. See Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 322 (Utah Ct. App.
1988); see also Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1980). Because the
undisputed facts in the record show that both elements are present in the current
matter, this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling. Furthermore this Court
should grant Martella's Motion for Summary Judgment.
A.

Mutual Assent Was Present, As Evidenced By The Signed Real
Estate Purchase Contract

It is undisputed that the parties executed a written agreement (the Contract)
under which Martella agreed to purchase and Gunnison Dairy agreed to sell to
Martella the Dairy Assets (R. 247-48:1, 264:3, 267-79, see generally 109-111).
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The parties' mutual assent was clearly demonstrated after Gunnison Dairy counteroffered and Martella accepted said counter-offer (R. 276). The parties
memorialized their agreement in a Real Estate Purchase Contract (the Contract)
and its accompanying addenda signed by both Martella and Gunnison Dairy on
August 27, 1998, and August 25, 1998, respectively (R. 267-79). These
undisputed facts and the language of the Contract show that all of the essential
elements of a valid, enforceable contract were present within the written
agreement. See Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building & Loan Ass'n, 94
Utah 97, 112, 75 P.2d 669, 676 (Utah 1938) ("The essential elements of a valid
contract are (1) a proper subject matter, (2) competent parties, (3) assent or
meeting of the minds of the parties, and (4) consideration.").
B.

The Contract To Purchase The Dairy Assets Was Not
Conditioned Upon The Eventual Purchase Of Gunnison Dairy's
Feed On Hand,

The purchase of Gunnison Dairy's feed was not a condition of the parties'
agreement (R. 248:5, 264:9). A "condition" is defined as "a fact (other than mere
lapse of time) which must occur before a duty of immediate performance of a
promise arises." See Restatement of Contracts § 250. Nowhere in the Contract or
its accompanying addenda does any such condition appear (see generally R. 26773) (no conditions listed). Specifically, the Contract and its addenda do not state
that purchase of the Dairy Assets listed in paragraphs 1.1 through 1.3 was
17

conditioned upon Martella buying Gunnison Dairy's "feed on hand." (Id.)
Gunnison Dairy had the opportunity to place such a condition on the
transaction when it made its counter-offer to Martella. However, Gunnison
Dairy's counter-offer (which they drafted), Addendum No. 2 (R. 276-77) contains
no such condition. See IdL If Gunnison Dairy was concerned about the disposition
of the feed products stored at the dairy complex, it could have easily included a
requirement that Martella had to purchase all "feed on hand" and feed that the
Dairy had contracted for.4 This simple omission from both the Contract and its
accompanying addenda clearly indicates that the purchase of "feed on hand" was
not a condition placed upon the parties' Contract. Because of this, the trial court's
ruling should be reversed.
C.

Even If The Parties Intended "Feed On Hand" To Be An Item
Included And Being Sold Under The Contract The Lack Of
Specificity As To Quantity And Price Does Not Make The
Contract Unenforceable.

Even if this Court finds that the parties intended "feed on hand" to be an
item included and being sold under the Contract, however, the Contract is still
definite enough concerning "feed on hand" to be enforceable. In Brown's, this

4 For instance, in Addendum No. 2, ff 1-2, Gunnison Dairy was specific in
abolishing certain conditions in Addendum #1. Likewise, in % 4, Gunnison Dairy
was equally specific about certain terms of the Contract including, inter alia,
adjusting the total animal count and the price of the cattle types (R. 216-18;
Summary Judgment Hearing Transcript, pp. 40-41).
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Court stated:
There is no principle in equity that demands all the terms of the
contract must be set forth in the written agreement. Rather, although
an agreement is uncertain or incomplete in some respects, its specific
performance may nevertheless be decreed where the uncertainty
relates to matters which the law makes certain or complete by
presumption, rule or custom, or usage. When the major aspects of the
contract are specified with requisite certainty, this court will not allow
incidental details in a contract to deny specific performance.
955 P.2d at 363-64. Custom and usage can easily be utilized to determine the
quantity and selling price of Gunnison Dairy's "feed on hand."
With regards to quantity, Gunnison Dairy has devoted a large portion of its
Memorandun Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply Memorandum
explaining what "feed on hand" consists of, based on local custom and usage. (See
generally R. 108-224; 317-37). On Summary Judgment, Martella did not dispute
Gunnison Dairy's inflated and exaggerated definition of "feed on hand," which
included crops still in the field, and even ungrown crops. (R. 255-56). A simple
inventory of "feed on hand" by the Gunnison Dairy would have provided the trial
court with the necessary information as to the feed to be sold under the Contract.
With regards to determining the price of the "feed on hand," both parties
agree that the universal method of determining the price of animal feed and other
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agricultural commodities is to look to local market prices.5 The Utah Supreme
Court in, Plateau Mining Co.v. Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry,
endorsed the use of market values when determining contract prices by stating,
"[a]n agreement which sets a price that is determined by factors outside a contract,
such as market price or the price in another contract is valid and enforceable." 802
P.2d 720, 726 (Utah 1990) (emphasis added). Because Utah courts can and do 'Till
in the gaps" when local trade and custom allows it to, this Court should reverse the
trial court's conclusion that the Contract was unenforceable as a matter of law.
D.

Even If The Parties Intended "Feed On Hand" To Be An Item
Included And Being Sold Under The Contract, The Contract Is
Enforceable Pursuant To U.C.A. § 70A-2-204(3).

Even if the parties intended "feed on hand" to be an item included and being
sold under the Contract, the Court should apply Utah's version of the Uniform
Commercial Code in determining whether the Contract is enforceable. Utah Code
Ann. § 70A-2-201 states, "[u]nless the context otherwise requires, this chapter
applies to transactions in goods." Goods are defined as "all things that are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale . . . . including] unborn
young of animals and growing crops." See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2- 105(a)

5 Gunnison Dairy admits that looking to the local market price on any given date is
the custom for determining the value of various types of feed. (See R. 118, "Each
partner who sells [feed] to the Dairy sells on market prices") (emphasis added.)
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(emphasis added). Under the above definitions, the Contract, at least as it relates to
the sale of feed and other personal property, is governed by Article 2 of Utah's
Uniform Commercial Code.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-204(3) is especially helpful in determining
whether the Contract is too indefinite to make it enforceable. Section 70A-2204(3) reads:
Even though one or more terms are left open, a contract for sale does
not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an
appropriate remedy.
Applying this Section to the undisputed facts in the record, it is clear that the
Contract should not fail for indefiniteness.6 As described above, the parties

6 The official comments to § 2-204(3) are insightful in the instant case. The
comments state:
If the parties intended to enter into a binding agreement, this
subsection recognizes that agreement as valid in law, despite missing
terms, if there is any reasonable basis for granting a remedy. The test
is not certainty as to what the Parties were to do nor as to the exact
amount of damages due the Plaintiff. Nor is the fact that one or more
terms are left to be agreed upon enough in and of itself to defeat an
otherwise adequate agreement.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-204, cmt (1977) (emphasis added). It should
be further noted that Utah has not adopted the "official comments" to Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, although the Utah Supreme Court has
stated, "[i]n interpreting provisions of our code, we often turn to the official
comments of the Uniform Commercial Code for guidance." Scharf v. BMG
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
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intended to enter into a contract as evidenced by the signed Contract and its
accompanying addenda. Furthermore, there is a reasonably certain basis (local
trade and custom) under which the Court and the parties can ascertain the quantity
and price of feed if the Court chooses to interject feed into the parties' agreement.
Therefore, the Contract is enforceable, Gunnison Dairy's Summary Judgment
Motion should be reversed, and Martella's Summary Judgment Motion should be
granted.
E.

Gunnison Dairy Should Not Be Allowed To Assert The
Definiteness Rule As A Defense To Their Breach Of The
Contract.

The trial court relied on Gunnison Dairy's recitation of Utah law concerning
specific enforcement of contracts (See generally R. 108-127). Generally, Utah
courts will not enforce a contract unless the parties set forth their obligations with
sufficient definiteness. See Brown's, 955 P.2d at 363; Southland Corp., 760 P.2d
at 322; Kier, 478 P.2d at 330. This rule is known at common law as the
"definiteness rule."
In relying on the definiteness rule, the trial court appears to have overlooked
an essential caveat to the rule. The Utah Supreme Court in Kier wrote this
concerning the caveat:
We recognize the validity of the rule relied upon by the Defendants
that to be enforceable a contract must be sufficiently definite in its
terms that the parties know what is required of them. But like all
22

rules, which are necessarily stated in generality, it is only applicable
in the proper circumstances, where the justice of the case requires: as
a shield to protect a party from injustice, and not as a weapon with
which to perpetrate an injustice.
478 P.2d at 330.
With its ruling, the trial court has allowed Gunnison Dairy to use the
defmiteness rule as a sword, not a shield. Gunnison Dairy has sought to avoid its
obligations under the Contract for several financial/economic reasons. First,
Gunnison Dairy did not want to perform under the Contract because to do so might
cause them to be stuck with surplus feed which they might be unable to resell.
Second, Gunnison Dairy did not want to perform under the Contract because it
stood to earn increased revenue because of the rejuvenated milk market. Third,
Gunnison Dairy did not want to perform under the Contract because several of its
partners stood to lose the "double income" they received from the Dairy.
Gunnison Dairy openly acknowledges that several of its principals make a
secondary profit, aside from the Dairy's milk and cattle sales, by selling feed
directly to it (R. 118-19; 199:9). These principals must have been concerned that
their "captive buyer" may not be so captive in the future. Regardless of the
financial or economic reason, to deprive a party of profits they might otherwise
have made is not a bar to enforcement of a contract that is otherwise fair. See
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028,
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1046 (Utah 1985) ("The mere fact that specific performance of the contract would
deprive the [party] of large profits they might otherwise have made is not a bar to
the enforcement if the contract is otherwise fair.").
Gunnison Dairy should not be allowed to rescind the Contract simply
because of a shift in the market place or because of "seller's remorse." See Richins
v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 382, 386 n. 2 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(Defendant's arguments were reduced to nothing more than "buyers remorse" and
disregarded once it had been established that he had ratified the agreement).
Gunnison Dairy is required to act in good faith in performing the Contract in
accordance with its expressed intent. To this end, the Utah Supreme Court has
stated:
We have no disagreement with the general proposition that a contract
will not be specifically enforced unless the obligations of the parties
are "set forth with sufficient definiteness that it can be performed."
But to be considered therewith is the further proposition that the
parties to a contract are to proceed in good faith to cooperate in
performing the contract in accordance with its expressed intent.
Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979). Accordingly, the trial court's
ruling should be reversed and, as a matter of law, Martella's Motion for Summary
Judgment should be granted.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CONCLUDE, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, THAT GUNNISON DAIRY BREACHED THE
CONTRACT BY REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO MANDATORY
MEDIATION.
Paragraph 15 of the Contract, labeled "Dispute Resolution," required the

parties to this dispute to first submit the matter to mediation before engaging in
litigation. According to paragraph 15, "[t]he parties agree that any dispute, arising
prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract SHALL . . . first be submitted to
mediation." (R. 271) (emphasis added).7
As set forth in the Statement of Relevant Facts, above, Martella requested
that mediation be held immediately, pursuant to the mandatory mediation provision
of the Contract, upon receiving Gunnison Dairy's Notice of Rescission. Gunnison
Dairy, however, refused to submit the matter to mediation. (R. 249:9, 265:12, 287,
289; see also Summary Judgment Hearing Transcript, p. 42-3). Martella alleged
this breach of the Contract in his complaint (R. 1-24). This matter was also
argued to the trial court at the Summary Judgment hearing (Summary Judgment
Hearing Transcript, p. 41-3). Gunnison Dairy's defense was that the mandatory

7 Paragraph 15 of the Contract allowed the parties to decided whether they wanted
the mediation requirement to be discretionary or mandatory (i.e., it allowed the
parties to decide whether any dispute "SHALL" or "MAY" first be submitted to
mediation. Significantly, the parties checked the box next to the word "SHALL,"
thereby meaning that the parties agreed to mandatory mediation of any disputes
related to the Contract. (R. 271).
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mediation provision was nothing more than an agreement to agree. (See R. 32728:13). Although the trial court made no specific conclusion in its Summary
Judgment on the issue of mediation, it effectively dismissed the claim by granting
summary judgment in favor of Gunnison Dairy. As such the trial court erred by
failing to conclude, as a matter of law that Gunnison Dairy breached the Contract
by refusing to submit to mandatory mediation pursuant to the dispute resolution
provision (Section 15) of the Contract. Accordingly, Martella would request that
trial court's grant of Summary Judgment be reversed.
IV.

GUNNISON DAIRY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SHOULD BE REVERSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
RULE 4-501(2)(A) OF THE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION RULES.
Martella respectfully reasserts its procedural objection (see R. 246-47) to

Gunnison Dairy's Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and Reply Memorandum. Said Memoranda failed to comply with Rule
4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration. Rule 4-501, applicable to "motion
practice in all trial courts of record," states that a Memorandum in Support of a
Motion for Summary Judgment "shall begin with a section that contains a concise
statement of material facts as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists."
See J. Admin. Rule 4-501(2)(a). Further, Rule 4-501(2)(a) requires that the facts
"be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those
portions of the record upon which the movant relies."
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Gunnison Dairy's Memorandum Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment
failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 4-501(2)(a) by failing to set forth a
concise statement of material facts. Gunnison Dairy's section entitled "Preliminary
Statement and Statement of Facts" does state some facts, but does so without
adequately referring to affidavits, the written contract, or any other record. Most
importantly, the factual assertions are not numbered and are intertwined within
legal arguments and conjecture. As the party opposing Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, Martella should not be obligated to discern what facts are
asserted as undisputed and attempt to controvert them. This task, coupled with the
reality that the facts were hidden amongst an over-length legal argument
containing numerous statements of hearsay and mere conjecture, made the task of
responding arduous, if not impossible. Martella therefore reasserts his procedural
objection and requests that the Court reverse the trial court's decision to grant
summary judgment in favor of Gunnison Dairy.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant Martella respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the trial court's grant of Summary Judgment in favor of Gunnison
Dairy and, instead, grant Summary Judgment in favor of Martella. In the
alternative, Martella respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's
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ruling and remand the case to the Sixth Judicial District Court for further
proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of September, 2000.
SNOW NUFFER

A Professional Corporation

TERRY L. WADE
HEATH H. SNOW
JEFFERY S. JUDD
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ROBIN MARTELLA
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Heath H. Snow, certify that on the 1st day of September, 2000, I served
two (2) copies of the attached BRIEF OF APPELLANT ROBIN MARTELLA
upon each of the following by mailing the copies by first class mail with sufficient
postage pre-paid to the following addresses:
Ken Chamberlain
Richard K. Chamberlain
CHAMBERLAIN ASSOCIATES

P.O. Box 100
225 North 100 East
Richfield, Utah 84701
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees

HEATH H. SNOW

Attorney for Appellant Robin Martella
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ROBIN MARTELLA,

Order on Motion For Summary Judgment

Plaintiff,

Case No. 980600349

vs.

Assigned Judge: David L. Mower

GUNNISON DAIRY PARTNERSHIP, et al,
Defendant.

The above matter was considered by the Court on March 1, 2000 at Manti,
Utah. No evidence was presented; rather there was argument by counsel as to their
cross-motions for summary judgment.
From the affidavits and pleadings in the file, it appears to me that the
following occurred:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On February 25, 1998 the defendant dairy (which was then, has continued to
be and is now an operating business) was listed for sale through a realtor.
There was a listing agreement which included a list of items to be sold.

2.

On that date the dairy was an operating business and has continued to be
every day since. All hvestock is fed daily from an inventory of feed products

Order on Motion For Summary Judgment, Case number 980600349, Page -2maintained on the premises.
3.

On August 17, 1998 plaintiff was at the dairy. He had the opportunity to see
the land, the buildings, the equipment, the animals and their feed.

4.

On August 20, 1998 plaintiff signed a document entitled Real Estate
Purchase Contract (REPC). The document contained some 12 pages,
including:

5.

a.

The Real Estate Purchase Contract itself, 7 pages

b.

Addendum #1 to REPC, 2 pages, and

c.

Addendum #1 to Listing Agreement, 3 pages.

The Addendum #1 to REPC contains this language: "Price does not include
feed on hand. Value to be negotiated at the time of closing."

6.

The quoted language is the only place in the REPC that the word "feed" is
used as a noun.

7.

Plaintiff is in the dairy business.
DECISION
The contract is unenforceable. Defendant' motion for summary judgment

ought to be granted. Plaintiffs motion ought to be denied.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff is in the dairy busienss. He must have known that animals require

Order on Motion For Summary Judgment, Case number 980600349, Page -3daily feeding and that the only practical way to do this is to draw from an inventory
of feed products keep on hand at the dairy site. Plaintiff visited this particular dairy
site and saw the inventory of feed on hand.
The parties included in their written agreement the language: "Price does not
include feed on hand. Value to be negotiated at the time of closing."
These facts lead me to conclude that the parties intended the "feed on hand"
to be an item included and being sold under the REPC. It was the price of the feed
that was not included, since the quantity would vary from day to day.
The REPC contains no precise method to be used in calculating the price. The
method contemplated is negotiation.
That portion of the REPC is an agreement to agree. It is beyond the province
of the Court to order the parties to agree. It is impossible for the Court to order the
parties to negotiate.
Mr. Chamberlain is assigned the task of drafting an appropriate order and of
submitting it for execution by following the procedure set forth in Rule 4-504, Code
of Judicial Administration.
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DaVtcTL. Mower
District Court Judge
FICATE OF SERVICE
above Order on Motion For Summary Judgment was sent to each of
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Terry L. Wade
Attorney At Law
192 East 200 North, Third Floor
P.O. Box 400
St. George, UT 84771-0400
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Ken Chamberlain
Attorney At Law
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P.O. Box 100
Richfield, UT 84701
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

ROBIN MARTELLA,
Plaintiff,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
vs.
GUNNISON DAIRY PARTNERSHIP, a Utah
General Partnership; JOHN P.
BARTHOLOMEW; CHARLES H. PETERSON;
DOUGLAS BJERREGAARD; MARYANN
BJERREGAARD; LAWRENCE JENSEN;
BONNIE A. NAY; PAUL F. DYRENG;
GENE R. YARDLEY; MARY T. YARDLEY;
L. GROVER CHILDS; KEITH JENSEN;
A. EUGENE JENSEN; WALDO BECK;
GENE HYATT; REID C. KNUDSEN;
NEDRA STEWART; HENRY D. MALMGREN;
BERNARD M. SORENSON; GUNNISON
VALLEY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a
former Utah Corporation; and JOHN
DOES I through XX,

<1 S 6b O034<7 *£•
Civil No. aQ0G00325
Chief Judge David L. Mower

Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * *

A hearing on the competing or cross-motions for SummaryJudgment was heard by the Honorable David L. Mower, Chief
District Judge for the Sixth Judicial District Court for Sanpete

MARTELLA vs. GUNNISON DAIRY et al.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 980600325
Page 2

County at Manti, Utah on March 1, 2000 time and date assigned by
the Court for convenience of counsel; the Plaintiff Robin
Martella was represented by Terry L. Wade of the firm of Snow,
Nuffer, Engstrom, Drake, Wade & Smart and Ken Chamberlain and
Richard Chamberlain of their firm appeared representing the
Defendant Partnership and the individually named persons,
partners in Gunnison Dairy Partnership;
Counsel for both Plaintiff and Defendant acknowledged to the
Court that the competing motions, subject to approval of the
Court, could be regarded as definitive cross-motions on each and
both sides and that all evidence relevant to this case had been
submitted to the Court in briefs under Rule 4-501 of the Judicial
Code, Operation of the District Courts; and the Court having
considered the pleadings, the affidavits and the several
memoranda and the Court having heard arguments from counsel for
both the Plaintiff and the Defendants and having determined that
all material facts necessary to a decision of the Court were
those set out in the written Memorandum as the "Order on Motion
for Summary Judgment" which the Court determined as Findings of
Fact which are incorporated in this Summary Judgment as the Order
of the Court expressed in its written ruling dated March 7, 2000.
And the Court's Conclusions of Law having been expressed in

MARTELLA vs. GUNNISON DAIRY et al.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 980600325
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that Memorandum Decision as the Court!s "analysis"; and that
analysis is incorporated in this Judgment; and the Court having
rendered his Decision that the Defendants1 Motion for Summary
Judgment should be granted and the Plaintiff's Motion should be
denied.
NOW THEREFORE it is the Judgment, Order and Decree of the
Court that the Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment should be
granted and hereby is granted and the Motion of Plaintiff for
Summary Judgment is denied.
No costs are awarded and each side shall bear its or their
own attorneys fees predicated on the absence of any agreement for
attorneys fees or costs or either or both attorneys fees and
costs.
This Judgment having been served upon counsel for the
Plaintiff as required by Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial
Administration and Operation of the Courts and are the
requirements of the Judicial Code respecting decisions and Orders
of the Court having been met the foregoing Order has a Summary
Judgment in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff is
hereby entered adopting the Findings, Analysis and written
decision of the Court of March 7, 2000 are reaffirmed and
incorporated herein.
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DATED this

day of March, 2000.
BY THE COURT:

Ot^

Hohdrable David L. Mower,
Chief District Judge
Sixth Judicial District of Utah

MAILING CERTIFICATE
A full true and correct copy of the foregoing was served
upon Terry L. Wade of Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom, Drake, Wade & Smart
at 192 East 200 North, P.O. Box 400, St. George, Utah (847710400JL by placing in the United States mail, postage prepaid, this
day of March, 2000.
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